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BEYOND REPROACH? THE MILITARY
COMMISSIONS ACT OF 2006 AND THE
SUPREME COURT'S INABILITY TO
NULLIFY EXECUTIVE INTERPRETATIONS
OF WHAT CONSTITUTES A NONGRAVE
BREACH OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
Abstract: In response to Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Congress passed
the Military Commissions Act of 2006, authorizing the President, to de-
termine what actions related to the treatment of suspected terrorist de-
tainees constitute nongrave breaches of the Geneva Conventions. This
Note examines how the Supreme Court should decide a case challeng-
ing one of the President's interpretations of what behavior falls within
that category. It first examines the relevant cases including those ad-
dressing the power of the President to direct foreign policy, the political
question doctrine, the implications of the legislative branch's authoriza-
tion of executive actions, the Chevron doctrine, and treaty interpretation
principles. It next applies the law in each of these areas to the Presi-
dent's authority tinder the Military Commissions Act and determines
that any challenge to the President's authority pursuant to this Act
should be either dismissed as nonjusticiable, or a decision should be
rendered in favor of the President's interpretation. This Note concludes
broffering other methods through which persons could bring a halt to
offensive, torturous behavior.
INTRODUCTION
On June 29, 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions applies to
the conflict with al Qaeda, the primary focus of the War on Terror-
ism.' In the months following this decision, the George W. Bush ad-
See 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2756-57 (2006) (holding that "there is at least one provision of
the Geneva Conventions that applies here ..." and that provision is Common Article 3).
Common Article 3 articulates general principles of humanitarian law and is common to all
four Geneva Conventions. Convention (First) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First Geneva Convention]; Convention (Second) for the Amelio-
ration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed
Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Ge-
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ministration encouraged Congress to rectify the apparent confusion
as to what, exactly, the Geneva Conventions demand with regard to
the treatment of suspected terrorist detainees, and requested that
Congress "list the specific, recognizable offenses that would be con-
sidered crimes under the War Crimes Act so [military] personnel can
know clearly what. is prohibited in the handling of terrorist enemies." 2
In response, Congress passed the Military Commissions Act of 2006
("MCA"), setting forth the governing standards of the Geneva Con-
ventions as they apply to those charged with their enforcement.'
The MCA, amending the War Crimes Act, 4 makes clear that these
laws together now "fully satisfy the obligation under Article 129 of the
Third Geneva Convention for the United States to provide effective
penal sanctions for grave breaches which are encompassed in common
Article 3."5 Although the exact terms of the statute are open to inter-
pretation, this Note proceeds from the understanding that the MCA
impliedly sets out three tiers of offenses contained in the Geneva Con-
ventions. 6 The first tier includes grave breaches, which are listed in the
text of the statute as elastic categories of offenses.? The President is free
to interpret them, but those interpretations are merely persuasive, not
authoritative.8 The second category includes nongrave, or "lesser,"
breaches of the Geneva Conventions that are not defied clearly by ei-
ther the MCA or the Conventions. 9 The President may interpret the
Geneva Conventions 'to determine what constitutes a nongrave breach,
and those interpretations of what falls in this category are authorita-
tive.i° Finally, there is a category of actions that are neither grave
neva Convention]; Convention (Third) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art.
3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention];
Convention (Fourth) Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3.
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].
2 Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1569, 1575 (Sep. 6,
2006).
' Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat. 2600, 2632
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp. IV 2007)).
4 War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2001 & Stipp. 2007), amended by
Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6.
5 Set Military Conrunissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (2).
See id. § 6(a).
7 See id.; War Crimes Act of 1996 § 2441(d).
Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (C).
° See id. § 6(a) (3) (A).
10 See id.; Posting of Jack Balkin to Balkinization, hup://balkin.blogspot.com/2006/
09/what-hamdan-hath-wrought,litml (Sept. 26, 2006, 6:00 a.m.) (observing that under
the—at the time, proposed—MCA, the President "now has virtually conclusive authority to
interpret nongrave breaches of Geneva").
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breaches nor nongrave breaches as interpreted by the President, and
therefore, performing such actions does not violate the Geneva Con-
ventions." This Note focuses exclusively on this elusive middle cate-
gory, wherein the President is empowered to determine what actions
constitute nongrave offenses and are therefore punishable as violations
of the Geneva Conventions. 12
The MCA provides the President with "the authority for the
United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva
Conventions and to promulgate higher standards and administrative
regulations for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions?" It requires that the President
issue interpretations by executive order, which are "authoritative ... as
a matter of United States law" and are published in the Federal Register. 14
Moreover, the MCA states that federal courts do not have jurisdiction to
"hear or consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or
on behalf of an alien [properly] detained by the United States." 15
Although the MCA's grant of authority to the President is unambi-
guous, it is less clear what specifically about the Geneva Conventions
the President is authorized to interpret. 16 As explained above, this Note
interprets the MCA as empowering the President to determine what
constitutes a nongrave offense of the Geneva Conventions." The MCA
permits the President to set higher standards for nongrave breaches of
the Conventions, but this depends on an interpretation of what consti-
tutes a nongrave offense. 18
 There are also doubts as to whether the U.S.
11 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (A)—(C).
12 See id. § 6(a) (3) (A).
15 Id.
14 Id. § 6(a) (3) (B)—(C).
15 Id. § 7. Media coverage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006 has noted that the law
"does not just allow the president to determine the meaning and application of the Geneva
Conventions; it also strips the courts of jurisdiction to hear challenges to his interpretation."
Scott Shane & Adam Liptak, Detainee Bill Shifts Power to President, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2006, at
Al. Another commentator is less certain of the provision's impact and instead wonders,
"Might Section 8 ... be invoked as an effort to render presidential readings of treaties final
and binding on the courts?" Aziz l-luq, How the Military Commissions Act of 2006 Threatens Judi-
cial Independence: Attempting to Keep the Courts Out of the Business of Geneva Conventions Enforre-
ment, FINDLAW, Sept. 26, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/conunentary/20060926_huq .
hunt.
16 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (A).
17
 See id. § 6(a); Shane & Liptak, supra note 15.
18
 Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (A) ("RI he President has the authority
for the United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva ConVentions
and to promulgate higher standards and administrative regulations for violations of treaty
obligations which are not grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions.").
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federal courts can review the President's interpretations of the Geneva
Conventions. 19 This Note assumes that in challenges brought before
the Supreme Court by those seeking to contest the President's interpre-
tations of the Geneva Conventions, the jurisdictional element of the
MCA will be rejected and the Court will be authorized to review the
President's interpretation . 20
Having stated these foundational assumptions, this Note focuses
on potential challenges to the decision of a President who, pursuant to
the authority to interpret the Geneva Conventions, determines that
certain interrogation tactics do not constitute nongrave offenses. 21 This
Note argues, based on the Court's own jurisprudence, that such chal-
lenges to the executive branch's interpretations should either be re-
jected by the Court out of deference to the President's interpretation,
or considered nonreviewable. 22 In setting forth this argument, this
Note seeks to demonstrate how the MCA has created a formidable bar-
rier protecting the President's power to interpret the United States'
international obligations. 23 Despite accepting that a particular interpre-
19 See Huq, supra note 15. The issue of jurisdiction in federal courts is very much a live
one, as the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided in
February 2007 that to accept the argument that the federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
detainees' habeas petitions "would be to defy the will of Congress." Boumediene v. Bush,
476 F.3d 981, 987 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Recently granting petition for rehearing in Boumedi-
ene v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court will this fall hear a challenge to the MCA's provisions
"purport[ing] to strip federal court jurisdiction over habeas corpus petitions from Guan-
tanamo Bay prisoners." Press Release, WilmerHale, Supreme Court Grants Permission for
Rehearing in Guantanamo Case (June 29, 2007), http://wilmerhale.com/about/news/
riewsDetail.aspx?news = 1046.
10 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 7. It is important to note that, pursuant to
the MCA, international law cannot inform one's understanding of the Geneva Conven-
tion's requirements with regard to nongrave breaches of Common Article 3, and that the
text of the MCA is explicit in making the president's interpretations of these requirements
"authoritative." See id. § 6(a) (2), (3) (C). In light of this, it would be misleading to suggest
that this jurisdictional decision would be a simple one for a court; however, recently, legis-
lation has been introduced in the U.S. Senate that 'strikes at the core of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 by giving detainees access to U.S. courts." josh White, Bill Would
Restore Detainee's Rights, Define 'Combatant,' WASH. POST, Feb. 14, 2007, at A8. This so-called
"Restoring the Constitution Act of 2007" would "restrict the president's authority to inter-
pret when certain human rights standards apply to detainees," and raises new questions
about the validity of the MCA's provisions on jurisdiction. See id.
21 See infra note 139-274 and accompanying text.
22 See Shane & Liptak, supra note 15 (reasoning that the Bush administration would
likely survive any challenges to the bill, because '10 adding a Congressional imprimatur
to a comprehensive set of procedures and tactics, lawmakers explicitly endorsed measures
that in other areas were achieved by executive fiat. Earlier Supreme Court decisions have
suggested that the president and Congress acting together in the national security arena
can be an all-but-unstoppable force").
23 See infra note 139-274 and accompanying text.
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tation by the President might seriously violate the spirit of the Geneva
Conventions, this Note nonetheless maintains that the democratic ma-
chinery by which the U.S. government operates demands that such is-
sues be resolved not by the judiciary; but by the political branches. 24
Part I examines the areas of U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence
relevant to deciding the issue presented here. 25 Part II applies the the-
ory and precedents surveyed in Part I to the MCA and the President's
authority to interpret nongrave offenses of the Geneva Conventions. 26
Part III offers alternative methods, outside of the judicial branch, that
one could pursue in challenging the President's interpretations. 27 This
Note concludes that the course of action most consistent with the
Court's jurisprudence and the interests of democratic government
would be one that defers to the President's interpretations.
I. PRECEDENT RELEVANT TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT'S
CONSIDERATION OF THE MCA AND THE AUTHORITY
IT BESTOWS ON THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
Assuming that the Supreme Court determines that it does have the
power to review the President's interpretations of the United StateS'
obligations regarding lesser offenses of the Geneva Conventions, the
Court's jurisprudence in a number of different areas suggests that it
should not invalidate a reasonable interpretation proffered by the ex-
ecutive branch. 28 There are certain factors that the Court often consid-
ers in determining whether it should defer to the President's interpre-
tation of a statute or treaty. 29 The cases in each of the following areas of
the federal appellate courts' jurisprudence are pivotal in trying to as-
certain how the Court should respond to the challenged presidential
action: the power of the President to direct foreign policy, the political
question doctrine, the implications of the legislative branch's authori-
24 See infra note 139-274 and accompanying text.
25 See infra notes 28-138 and accompanying text.
26 See infra notes 139-259 and accompanying text.
21
 See infra notes 260-274 and accompanying text.
25 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997-98 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring); Youngs-
town Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring);
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); Oetjen v. Cent.
Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918).
29 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004.-05 (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at
320.
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zation of executive actions, the Chevron doctrine, and treaty interpreta-
tion principles."
A. Foreign Affairs and the Political Question Doctrine
Both the nature of the President's authority to direct. America's
relations with the rest of the world and the political question doctrine
have traditionally insulated certain executive branch actions from con-
centrated scrutiny. 31
1. The Unique Role of the President in Directing Foreign Affairs. and
the Deference Presidents Receive When Acting in This Arena
The issue of treatment of enemy combatants is arguably a matter
of foreign policy.32 Although the global community's demands for
humane treatment have been codified in domestic law, the roots of
laws like the MCA are found in international agreements such as the
Geneva Conventions." Thus, one must consider the authority that the
MCA grants to the President in light of the President's role in foreign
affairs.34
The Supreme Court most notably examined the President's au-
thority in matters of foreign affairs in 1936 in United Stales u Curtiss-
Wright Co1p. 35 The Court in Curtiss-Wright determined that a joint reso-
lution allowing the President to ban the sale of weapons to other
countries was a constitutional delegation of authority to the Presi-
dent.36 Justice Sutherland, writing for the Court, differentiated be-
3° Sec Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004-05 (Rehnquist, J., con-
curring); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 ( Jackson, J., concurring) Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at
320; Octjcn, 246 U.S. at 302. It is important to note at the outset that the issue presented
here concerns the President's authority to interpret an international agreement; this au-
thority, however, is based on a domestic law, namely the MCA. Sec generally Military Com-
missions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 Sc Supp. IV 2007)). Moreover, because the United
States is a party to the Geneva Conventions and they have been ratified after advice and
consent from the Senate, they are part of the domestic law of the United States. Sec First
Geneva Convention, supra note 1; Second Geneva Convention, supra note 1; Third Geneva
Convention, supra note 1; Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note I. In short, the MCA
authorizes the President to interpret the Geneva Conventions, which are both interna-
tional and domestic laws. See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (A).
31 See infra notes 32-65.
32 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § G(a) (3) (A).
33
 Sec id.
34 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
95
 See id.
36 See id. at 329.
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tween the President's authority to act with respect to foreign matters
as opposed to domestic matters, and established that the constitu-
tional constraint that the federal government can act pursuant only to
those powers specifically enumerated, as well as those necessary and
proper to carry out those enumerated powers, is true only with regard
to domestic matters." The Court asserted that the President has
broad inherent powers in the area of foreign policy. 38 It declared that
if the powers to declare and wage war, to negotiate treaties, and to sus-
tain diplomatic relations with other states had never been mentioned
in the Constitution, they would have vested in the federal government
as necessary concomitants of nationality. 38
The President's role in carrying out foreign policy is specia1. 40 In
such a multifaceted external realm, complete with complex and puz-
zling issues and exigencies, the President alone has the power to
speak as America's representative to the world. 41
 Among the reasons
why the President is better able to act unilaterally in the area of for-
eign affairs, the Court includes the fact that the President has more
access to information about the conditions in other countries, confi-
dential sources of information, and diplomatic and consular advisors
who are experts in their fields. 42 Consider, for example, the daily
presidential briefing, which provides the President with national secu-
rity information and expert analysis unavailable to both the American
public and congressional leaders. 43
At the time the Court issued its Curtiss-Wright opinion in 1936—
and perhaps even more so today—it was imperative that certain in-
formation gathered by government agents be kept secret because
premature disclosure could adversely affect strategic plans or cause
57 Id. at 315-16; see also, ER WIN CHEMERINSICY, CoNsTrruTtoNAL LAIN: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES § 4.6.1 (2d ed. 2002) (noting Justice Sutherland's explanation that authority
over domestic affairs was possessed by the states before the ratification of the Constitution
and that they, by approving the Constitution, bestowed power on the national government.
As to foreign policy, however, the power is inherently in the national government by virtue
of its being sovereign").
38 Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 318.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 319.
° Id.
42 Id. at 320.
43 See, e.g., Press Briefing, Dr. Condoleezza Rice, National Security Advisor Holds Press
Briefing (May 16, 2002), hup://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/05/20020516-
13.html (describing the controversial presidential daily briefing on August 6, 2002, refer-
encing Osama bin Laden's methods of operation and a potential hijacking plot unlike that
carried out on September 11, 2001).
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other harmful results." Additionally, Curtiss-Wright highlighted the
importance of speaking with a unified voice in the United States'
dealings with foreign powers, and the decision reminded Congress to
grant the executive branch more discretion and freedom from statu-
tory restrictions than would otherwise be permissible if domestic af-
fairs alone were involved. 45 Despite the attacks that have been waged
on the Court's reasoning in Curtiss-Wright, 46 the Court continues to
cite the decision as precedent for its holdings that the President, by
nature of the design of the office, has broad authority to act in the
area of foreign affairs. 47
2. The Political Question Doctrine and Escaping Judicial Review
In addition to deferential rulings on the merits, challenges to the
President's authority in the area of foreign policy may be dismissed as
nonjusticiable political questions.48 There are some specific categories
of cases in which the Court has applied the doctrine, although the
principles guiding the Court's decision about what is and is not a po-
litical question are not easily discernable from the Court's jurispru-
dence.49
The difficulty with the political question doctrine stems not from
its basic premise, but rather, the features that must be present in or-
der for the doctrine to be applied to a particular case. 50 Consider, on
44 See 299 U.S. at 320.
45 Id.
48 For an attack on the validity of the historical evidence used to support the decision
in Curtiss-Wright, see generally Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE U. 1 ( 1973). For a helpful summation of
the major criticisms of Curtiss-Wright, see Cit EM ER INS KY, supra note 37, § 4.6.1.
47 See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981); Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1004
(Rehnquist, J., concurring): see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 688 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting)
(referencing President Roosevelt's 'Stewardship Theory" of presidential power in general,
which holds that the President serves the people and must carry out that service where the
Constitution does not expressly forbid it); CH EN! MINSKY, supra note 37, § 4.6.1 ("Curtiss-
Wright is still cited by the Supreme Court as authority for broad inherent presidential
power in the area of foreign policy.").
48 See (Mien, 246 U.S. at 302; Theodore Blumoff, Judicial Review, Foreign Affairs, and Leg-
islative Standing, 25 GA. L. REV. 227, 235 (1991) (articulating the view that not until the
political branches disagree does the Court have before it both a controversy and a party
with an inarguably justiciable claim").
49 See CHEM ER INSKY, supra note 37, § 2.8.4 (discussing the Supreme Court's application
of the political question doctrine to specific areas of foreign policy).
5° See Blumoff, supra note 48, at 229 (arguing that 'neither constitutional text nor
Court opinions provide clear guidance" as to when federal courts should review foreign
policy decisions).
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the one hand, the Supreme Court's holding in 1918 in Oetjen v. Cen-
tral Leather Co. that the Constitution empowers the political branches
of government to conduct foreign relations, and that what these
branches do in exercising this power is not subject to judicial review. 51
A statement of this kind leads one to believe that the Court is firmly
setting forth a categorical rule regarding judicial review of matters
related to the conduct foreign affairs. 52
 Such credence cannot be
given to that proposition, however, when the Court reminds elsewhere
that "it is error to suppose that every case or controversy which
touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance." 53
One of the specific instances in which the Court has, in the past,
applied the political question doctrine is the President's interpreta-
tion of treaties. 54 This is relevant to the MCA because although it is a
law of the United States, it explicitly references the interpretation of
an international treaty—the Geneva. Conventions—and, moreover,
unambiguously bestows upon the President "the authority for the
United States to interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva
Conventions."55 Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in the 1979 Su-
preme Court case Goldwater v. Carter is instructive. 56 It holds that the
rescission of a treaty is a matter not for the courts, but rather for the
coequal, political branches of government, both of which are
equipped with adequate resources to protect and assert their own re-
spective interests. 57
Similarly, Justice Powell, concurring in the judgment, determined
that Congress's silence as to the President's authority to rescind trea-
ties made the issue not ready for judicial review. 58
 For Justice Powell,
until the political branches reach a stalemate, it is improper for fed-
eral courts to address the matter, 59
 In addition, citing the Court's ear-
lier decision in Baker v. Carr, Justice Powell commented that the fed-
51 246 U.S. at 302.
52 see id.
53
 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1961).
54 See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
55
 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub, L. No. 109-366, § 6(a) (3) (A), 120 Stat. 2600,
2632 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp. IV
2007)).
56
 444 U.S. at 1004 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
57 Id.
55 See id. at 997-98 (Powell, J„ concurring) ("The judicial Branch should not decide is-
sues affecting the allocation of power between the President and Congress until the politi-
cal brandies reach a Constitutional impasse ... land ill the Congress chooses not to con-
front the President, it is not our task to do so.").
55 Id. at 997.
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eral courts should take care to avoid the potentiality of embarrass-
ment resulting from different pronouncements by various branches
on one question.60 This idea is consistent with the Court's concern in
Curtiss-Wright that the United States speak on matters of international
importance through one consistent voice so as to avoid discrediting
itself abroad and putting the country's national security at risk.61
Finally, to understand the implications of the MCA, it is necessary
to distill two other principles articulated in Goldwater about the politi-
cal question doctrine. 52 The first, asserted by justice Rehnquist, is that
the President's ability to rescind a treaty obligation is a matter involv-
ing executive authority with respect to foreign affairs, and the extent
to which Congress is• empowered to reverse such an action by the
President; therefore, it presents a nonjusticiable political question. 65
On the other hand, according to Justice Brennan's understanding set
forth in his dissent in Goldwater, the political question doctrine only
restrains courts from reviewing the foreign policy decision of a branch
constitutionally empowered to make such a -decision.64 These two
opinions each present differing views as to when an executive action
involving treaty interpretation will be deemed a political question. 65
B. Congressional Contributions to the Scope of Executive Power
When the Supreme Court examines the limits of the President's
power to act without the authorization of Congress, and thus, pursu-
ant to the inherent power of the office, it frequently turns to its 1952
decision in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v., Sawyer for guidance. 66 The
Court in that case addressed a challenge raised by steel mill owners
who complained that President Truman impermissibly carried out
legislative functions without express congressional authorization when
he ordered that the Secretary of Commerce seize and operate most of
the country's steel mills. 67 The Truman administration feared that an
66 Id. at 1000 (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 217).
6' See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
n See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 1006-07 (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
63 Id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
" Id. at 1006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Baker, 369 U.S. at 211-13, 217).
65 See id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); id. at 1006-07 (Brennan,J., dissenting).
66 343 U.S. at 634-40; see Hamdi v. Rurnsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 581-86 (2004) (Thomas, ).,
dissenting) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 639 ( Jackson, J., concurring)); Crosby v. Nat'l
Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 375 (2000) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634
( Jackson, J., concurring)).
67 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582-83.
2007]	 Executive Interpretations of the Geneva Conventions
	 1019
ongoing labor dispute between steel companies and their employees
would cause steel production to cease, seriously compromising U.S.
national defense and security.68
Although Youngstown presents four different approaches, each
offering a framework by which to consider the extensive and unde-
fined powers of the President, 69
 Justice Jackson's is most important for
purposes of analyzing the MCA." In addition to the Court frequently
citing the Jackson opinion throughout its history,' 11
 the Court recently
in 2006 relied on that framework yet again in Hamdan v. Rutnsfeld. 2
Perhaps the best indication of how the current Court would examine
inherent presidential power is how Justice Kennedy does so. 73 In his
concurrence in Hamdan, Justice Kennedy made clear that the "proper
framework for assessing whether Executive actions are authorized is
the three-part scheme used by Justice Jackson in his opinion in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer."74 The Court, therefore, would
likely rely on Justice Jackson's framework when considering chal-
lenges to the President's authority under the MCA. 73
69 Id. at 583.
69 Id. at 634 ( Jackson, J., concurring).
70 See Dames Ze Moore, 453 U.S. at 661 (referencing the agreement among both parties
that Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Youngstown "brings together as much combi-
nation of analysis and common sense as there is in this area").
71 See id.; see also Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 581-86 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Crosby, 530 U.S. at
375.
72
 Sec generally 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006). The Court's reliance on Justice Jackson's ap-
proach in Youngstown appears almost unanimous because all eight justices participating in
Hamdan referenced, either implicitly or explicitly, Justice Jackson's model. See id. passim. In
Hamdan, the Court held that the military commissions and their governing procedures
established by President Bush in his November 13, 2001, comprehensive military order
violated the Uniform Code of Military Justice. See id at 2775, 2792-93. Five Justices also
determined that the military commissions at issue failed to meet the United States' obliga-
tions under the Geneva Conventions. Id. at 2793. With regard to the Geneva Conventions,
however, one of these five, Justice Kennedy, refused to consider the particular require-
ments of the Conventions, instead resting his decision on the military commissions' viola-
tion of domestic law. See id. at 2808-09 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
73 Adam Cohen, Anthony Kennedy Is Ready for His Close-Up, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2006, at
A16. Justice Kennedy is frequently the deciding vote on a variety of highly controversial
issues and "until [the Court's] membership changes again, he is likely often, although
certainly not always. to have the final word on such deeply divisive issues as abortion, af-
firmative action and campaign fmance." Id. At oral arguments for Hamdan, Justice Ken-
nedy "strongly suggested by his questions that he would join the four moderate justices in
rejecting the Bush administration's position on a key aspect of its war-on-terror powers.
That would be enough, because these days, the law is pretty much what Justice Kennedy
says it is." Id.
74 Horatian, 126 S. Ct. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
76 See id.
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Justice Jackson's approach to executive power begins with the
premise, endorsed by other justices on the Youngstown Court as well,
that the President has inherent authority to carry out any act not
barred by the Constitution or an act of Congress. 76 From there, Justice
Jackson goes on to identify three levels of executive authority." First,
when the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authoriza:
don of Congress, "his authority is at its maximum" because it includes
both the inherent power of the office and all the power that Congress
can delegate. 78 When the President acts at this level, he or she may be
said to "personify the federal sovereignty."79
The second level referenced by Justice Jackson involves when
Congress is silent about granting a particular power to the Executive,
and so there is uncertainty surrounding the constitutionality of Presi-
dential actions and authority. 8° When acting at this level, the President
can "rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a zone of
twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent authority, or
in which its distribution is uncertain." 81 Given such ambiguity at this
level of authority, circumstances often determine whether the Presi-
dent's actions are constitutional. 82 Because congressional silence
could be the result of rapid action by the executive branch in re-
sponse to some national crisis, it makes sense that any test of power
depend on "the' imperatives of events and contemporary imponder-
ables rather than on abstract principles of law." 83
The third level, at which the President's authority is at its "lowest
ebb," includes those instances when the President takes actions that
are incompatible with the expressed or implied will of Congress. 84
When acting at this level, the President is disregarding, and acting
contrary to, federal law; therefore, unless the law is determined to be
unconstitutional, the President's actions are not in conformity with
constitutional demands.85
76 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, j., concurring) (stating that the President's "powers are
not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress").
" See id. at 635-38.
78 Id. at 635; see Harridan, 126 S. Ct. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
76 Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 636 ( Jackson, J.. concurring).




84 Youngstown, 393 U.S. at 637 (Jackson. J., concurring).
86 See id. at 637-38 ( Jacksond., concurring).
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C. Deference to the Executive Branch's Interpretation of Delegated Authority
Relating to Foreign Affairs
When statutes pertain to foreign affairs and international obliga-
tions, courts typically defer to reasonable constructions of those stat-
utes by the agencies within the executive branch charged with their
administration. 86
 Interpretations of international conventions often
require an assessment of the varying factors that color the global po-
litical landscape, and, as Curtiss-Wright makes clear, the executive
branch is particularly suited to operate in this area. 87
 Furthermore,
such interpretations also often require that the interpreting authority
fill in gaps that, for whatever reason, were left open in the agreement
by the framers, 88
Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is an example of
such an agreement, and, until the Court intervened in Hamdan, the
President was acting according to his own understanding as to whether
the protections in Common Article 3 applied to those captured during
the seemingly endless War on Terrorism. 89
 It makes sense that the ex-
ecutive branch should be responsible for dealing with these chasms,
and when drafting laws involving international matters, Congress is of-
ten certain to grant the President this authority. 99
When reviewing an agency's interpretation of a statute that Con-
gress has empowered it to administer, the Court relies on the frame-
work first articulated in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
86 See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984); see also Springfield Indus. Corp. v.
United States, 842 F.2d 1284, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (explaining that the "'rule of defer-
ence' is particularly strong when, as here, not only is there an interpretation of the statute
by the officers or agency charged with its administration, but the agency action is in the
foreign affairs arena").
87 See 299 U.S. at 320.
e8 See Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 667
(2000) ("Interpretation of foreign affairs law may require assessments of international
conditions and relationships. Moreover, this law may have interpretive gaps that require, in
effect, lawmaking.").
en See 126 S. Ct. at 2796 ("Court of Appeals thought, and the Government asserts, that
Common Article 3 does not apply to Hamdan because the conflict with al Qaeda. being
'international in scope,' does not qualify as a 'conflict not of an international character.'
That reasoning is erroneous.").
9° See, e.g., Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a) (3) (A), 120
Stat. 2600, 2632 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp, 2006 &
Supp. IV 2007)); International Emergency Economic Powers Act, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-
' 1706 (West 2001 & Supp. 2006); Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-
3 (2000).
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Council, Inc. in 1984.91 Chevron involved the 1977 Congressional
amendments to the Clean Air Act that required those states that failed
to achieve the air quality standards previously set forth by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("EPA"), to establish a permit program to
regulate the "stationary sources" of air pollution. 92 In implementing
this permit program, the EPA allowed states to adopt a plant-wide defi-
nition of the statutory language, "stationary sources."93 As a result,
plants with multiple pollution-emitting devices were permitted to
change one such device without meeting the permit requirements, so
long as the alteration did not impact the overall pollution output of the
plant." The Supreme Court addressed whether this construction of
"stationary source" was proper, and ultimately determined that it was. 95
In reaching this conclusion, the Court set forth a two-part inquiry
for reviewing statutory interpretations by government agencies.96 The
first inquiry is whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise
question that is the subject of review. 97 If it has and Congress's intent is
clear, "that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency,
must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress." 98
If, on the other hand, Congress's intent is unclear or ambiguous, the
court's role is different and it must determine whether the agency's
interpretation is based on a permissible construction of the statute."
When Congress explicitly leaves a gap for the agency to fill, this consti-
tutes an express delegation of authority to the agency to "elucidate a
specific provision of the statute by regulation," and in such instances,
the agency regulations are given controlling weight unless they are arbi-
91 See Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in
ADMINISTRATIVE. LAW STORIES 399 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) ("Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, Inc. is the Supreme Court's leading statement about the
division of authority between agencies and courts in interpreting statutes."). Although the
MCA is like any other piece of legislation delegating to agencies within the executive
branch the authority to promulgate standards and issue regulations, the analogy to Chevron
is strained by the fact that the MCA delegates authority not to an agency within the execu-
tive department, but rather, directly to the Executive. See Military Commissions Act of 2006
§ 6(a) (3) (A). Nonetheless, Chevron articulates useful principles that are applicable here.
See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
99 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839-40.
99 See id. at 840.
94 Sec id.
" id. at 866.
96 See id. at 842-44.
97 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
98 Id. at 842-43.
99 See id. at 843.
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trary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.'" Although
Congress's delegation of authority may be either explicit or implicit,
the result is still the same, because the agency is empowered to inter-
pret the statute."'
In the case of the MCA, the fact that the agency involved is actu-
ally not contained in the executive branch, but rather, the Executive,
makes little difference because the President is empowered to inter-
pret an international agreement. 02 Even in those cases where there is
no domestic law like the MCA involved, and the sole question sur-
rounds the executive branch's interpretation of a treaty, the Court has
"given much weight" to that branch's interpretation. 1 Q3 Historically,
the Court has given considerable deference to the executive branch's
conduct of foreign affairs. 10" Thus, arguably, the President already has
the authority to interpret a treaty; however, the MCA codified this au-
thority in federal law.'"
When Congress delegates foreign affairs authority to the execu-
tive branch, circumstances necessitate that it do so more broadly than
it would when domestic subjects are at issue.'" As has been the case.
throughout history, the politics of international affairs is an unstable
and multifaceted arena, and as a result, one in which the more delib-
erate legislative branch is ill-suited to act with speedy adroitness. 107 On
the other hand, by nature of the office, the President can quickly be
100 Id. at 843-44.
tot See Merrill, supra note 91, at 401 ("By equating explicit and implicit delegations to
agencies to nu in statutory gaps, the Court seemed to say that anytime Congress charges an
agency with administration of a statute and leaves an ambiguity in the statute, it has impli-
edly delegated primary authority to the agency to interpret the statute.... This vastly ex-
panded the sphere of delegated agency lawmaking.").
102 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a) (3) (A). 120 Stat.
2600, 2632 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Stipp. 2006 & Stipp. IV
2007)). Although the Chevron framework is presented in this Note merely to provide an-
other analytical framework by which to examine the issue at hand, it should be noted that
the Court has determined that the President is not included in the Administrative Proce-
dure Act's definition of an agency. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800-01
(1992).
103 Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921) ("While the question of the construction
of treaties is judicial in its nature ... the construction placed upon the treaty before us and
consistently adhered to by the Executive Department of the Government, charged with the
supervision of our foreign relations, should be given much weight.").
104 See, e.g., Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17 (1965); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9
F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1199 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also infra notes 126-138 and accompanying
text.
1°° See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (A).
106 See Zernel, 381 U.S. at 17; see, e.g., Humanitarian Law Project, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1199.
107 See &met, 381 U.S. at 17.
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informed of critical information and obtain the counsel necessary to
act on that information.mFor these reasons, when Congress delegates
foreign affairs to the executive branch, it delegates such authority
broadly. 109
 In reviewing the executive branch's interpretations and
exercise of the power that it has been granted, courts have given Cheu-
wit-like deference to that branch's determinations. 110
With respect to the MCA, this analysis of Chevron-like deference
beyond the framework's first inquiry could prove to be futile." The
Chevron analysis is only relevant when congressional intent is ambigu-
ous, and this ambiguity is arguably absent from the MCA. 1 I 2 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit's 1996 decision in Marincas
Lewis illustrates a comparable circumstance.'" In Maiincas, the Third
Circuit addressed whether the U.S. Attorney General correctly inter-
preted the Refugee Act of 1980 and the Immigration and Nationality
Act when he set forth differing rules for those instances when an alien
seeking asylum is a stowaway.'" The petitioner, a stowaway from Ro-
mania seeking political asylum in the United States, appealed a de-
portation order issued by the Board of Immigration Appeals.' l5
i" See id.; Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
109 See &mei, 381 U.S. at 17.
110 Bradley, supra note 88, at 683. For example, in 1984 in Regan v. Wald, the U.S. Su-
preme Court gave deference to the Executive's judgment about his authority under the
Trading with the Enemy Act to restrict the scope of permissible travel-related transactions
with Cuba and its nationals. See 468 U.S. at 243. Similarly in 1986, in Japan Whaling Ass it v.
American Cetacean Society, the Court deferred to the executive branch's interpretation of the
Secretary of Commerce's statutory duties pursuant to the Pelly Amendment to the Fish-
ermen's Protective Act of 1967 and the Packwood Amendment to the Magnuson Fishery
Conservation and Management Act. See 478 U.S. 221,225,241 (1986). According to these
amendments, Congress granted the Secretary of Commerce the authority to determine
whether a foreign state's whaling practices exceeded the quotas determined by the Inter-
national Whaling Commission. See id. at 225. Ultimately, the Commerce Secretary deter-
mined that Japan's activities did not diminish the International Whaling Commission's
effectiveness. See id. at 241. In conjunction with this determination, the executive branch
resolved that ensuring Japan's future compliance with the quotas could best be achieved
through an Executive Agreement, and in pursuing that diplomatic option, decided that
the imposition of economic sanctions was not necessary. See id. The Court found that this
was a reasonable construction of the controlling amendments, because those amendments
left it to the Commerce Secretary's discretion to determine if Japan's noncompliance un-
dermined the International Whaling Commission's effectiveness. See id. at 241.
111 See infra notes 220-259 and accompanying text for analysis of the Military Commis-
sions Act of 2006 and whether Chevron deference applies to a President's interpretations of
the Geneva Conventions under that specific law.
112 See infra notes 220-259.
"3 See generally 92 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1996).
"4 Id. at 199.
115 Id. at 197.
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Congress passed the Refugee Act of 1980 to provide an orderly
system governing the admission of refugees. 116
 Pursuant to the Refu-
gee Act, the Attorney General was given the authority to promulgate
asylum procedures.m The petitioner in Marineas claimed that the At-
torney General failed to interpret his grant of authority properly and
insisted that Congress intended stowaways to be afforded the same
procedures granted to other aliens seeking asylum. 118
 The Third Cir-
cuit, using the guiding Chevron framework, determined that the ques-
tion could be resolved according to Chevron's first inquiry because the
plain meaning of the Refugee Act of 1980 was clear in its intent that
the Attorney General promulgate a uniform asylum procedure re-
gardless of whether or not the alien was a stowaway. 119 Therefore,
there was no need to proceed to Chevron's second inquiry.' 20
The major impetus behind the Court's deference, Chevron or
otherwise, to the executive branch's interpretation of its statutory au-
thority in matters of foreign affairs is accountability.' 21
 For all of the
reasons already examined, the executive branch is simply better suited
to handle the foreign policy responsibilities that it has been dele-
gated, and although agencies may not be directly accountable to the
people, the Executive is.I22 it is, therefore, entirely appropriate that
this branch make policy choices to resolve the issues that Congress
either accidentally failed to resolve, or intentionally left unresolved so
that they could be decided by the agency charged with the administra-
tion of the statute under the constraints of everyday realities.'" Thus,
challenges to the executive branch's statutory construction that focus
on a policy choice it made are likely to fail because this branch is both
politically accountable and better equipped to make such judgments
118 See id. at 198. As the Supreme Court explained in 1987 in INS IA Card OZa-Fon Seca,
Congress enacted the Refugee Act to "give the United States sufficient flexibility to re-
spond to situations involving political or religious dissidents and detainees throughout the
world," while also fulfilling its treaty obligations. 480 U.S. 421, 449 (1987).
117 See Refugee Act of 1980, 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (2000) ("The Attorney General shall es-
tablish a procedure for an alien physically present in the United States or at a land border
or port of entry, irrespective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may
be granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General ....").
118 92 F.3d at 200.
118 Id. at 201.
120 See id.
121 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865. For a discussion explaining why Chevron deference ap-
plies to "scope-of-authority" issues, see Bradley, supra note 88, at 680-85.
122 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
123 Id.
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with regard to international affairs.'" In these circumstances, defer-
ence to the executive branch is most appropriate, because 'federal
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate
policy choices made by those who do." 125
D. International Law and the President's Role in the Interpretation of Treaties
This discussion focuses on the executive branch's treaty interpre-
tation, not in the context of that authority being granted to it by a
congressional act, as is the case in the MCA, but as a general matter." 6
Although there is good reason to believe that any challenge to a
President's interpretation will be considered a nonjusticiable political
question, there is nothing certain about such a proposition, and it is
therefore important to consider how a court would review a question
of this nature.'" The Court is guided in its review of the executive
branch's interpretation by the principle that although it is not sacro-
sanct, the meaning given to treaty provisions by the agencies charged
with their negotiation and enforcement is entitled to great weight. 128
Of course, one would be hard pressed to find an instance in which the
Court declared that the Executive's interpretation of a treaty is con-
clusive; however, the jurisprudence is clear that such interpretations
carry some force.'"
Although the "Charming Betsy cannon" requires that laws of the
United States be construed in such a way that they do not conflict
with either conventional or customary international law,l' 0 Congress
can, in fact, violate both treaty and custon0 31 For example, in 1888
the Supreme Court in Whitney v. Robertson held that when there is a
124 See id. at 865-66.
126
 Id. at 866.
126 See infra notes 127-138 and accompanying text.
122 See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302.
128 United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji Am.,
Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982)).
129 See Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 295 (1933). This Note does not purport
to be an exhaustive discussion of how the Court would review a challenge to an interpreta-
tion of a treaty because although it is at least important to comprehend the basic princi-
ples, a discussion of such depth is inapplicable to the issue presented here, namely the
MCA. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat. 2600. 2632
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp. IV 2007)).
13° Bradley, supra note 88, at 685. See Murray v. The Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S.
(2 Crunch) 64, 118 (1809) (finding that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed
to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains ... [and that]
[t] hese principles are believed to be correct ... ?).
131 See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
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conflict between a treaty and a federal law, the one that is later in time
will control the other. 132
 There is also support for this same principle
with regard to customary law. 133 Regardless of the source of interna-
tional law at issue, Congress is empowered to enact statutes abrogat-
ing prior treaties or international obligations entered into by the
United States so long as Congress is clear in its intent.'"
Moreover, when the President acts pursuant to constitutionally
granted authority, the courts have not required that this action com-
port with international law. 133
 In 1986, in Garcia Mir v.. Meese, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit determined that, although
international law prohibited arbitrary detention, the executive branch
was permitted to act contrary to those norms by detaining a group of
unadmitted aliens. 136
 Thus, the court reaffirmed the President's
power to disregard international law in service of domestic needs. 137 It
follows that a President acting pursuant to a statute may have to vio-
late an international convention if the terms of that convention con-
flict with the domestic law's demands.'"
H. APPLYING THE SUPREME COURT'S JURISPRUDENCE TO THE MCA's
GRANT OF AUTHORITY TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES
When considering whether a President has impermissibly inter-
preted the Geneva Conventions with respect to what can be classified
as a nongrave breach, the Supreme Court should act according to the
principles of its own aforementioned jurisprudence, and either up-
hold the President's interpretation or fund that the challenge presents
a question that is nonjusticiable. 136
 Although this Note assumes that
132 See 129 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); see also Breard, 523 U.S. at 376 (holding that because a
congressional act is equal in weight to that of a ratified treaty, "when a statute which is
subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute to the extent of conflict renders
the treaty null") (quoting Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957)).
133 See, e.g., Galo-Garcia v. INS, 86 F.3d 916, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that "where a
controlling executive or legislative act does exist, customary international law is inapplica:
ble"). For purposes of the MCA, custom is only relevant to the extent that it is either crys-
tallized in, or catalyzed by, the Geneva Conventions. Sec id.
. 134 United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1956, 1465 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
195 Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1496, 1454-55 (11th Cir. 1986); STEPIIF.N C.
MCCAFFREY, UNDERSTANDING INTERNATIONAL LAW 28 (2006).
1!6 See 788 F.2d at 1453-54.
137 See id. at 1455.
"6 See id.
139 See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S, 837, 842-243
(1984); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 393 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) ( Jackson, J., concur-
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the Court will determine that it has the authority to review the Presi-
dent's interpretations, it is still bound by its own rulings. 140 This Part
argues that judicial precedent mandates that a President's offensive
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions under the MCA should not
be corrected by the courts, but rather, should be struck down by the
full weight of the United States Congress."'
One of the difficulties in evaluating this issue is assessing what
types of actions might be considered nongrave breaches of the Ge-
neva Conventions. 142 Considering what actions would fall outside the
category of those predetermined grave breaches helps to frame the
debate because one cannot determine his or her position on the MCA
without understanding what it permits and what is really at stake for
the alien unlawful enemy combatants to which it applies."3 Pursuant
to the MCA's revision of the War Crimes Act, "grave breaches" of
Common Article 3 are criminal and include torture,'" cruel or in-
human treatment, 145 performing biological experiments, 146 murder,"7
ring); United States V. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); Oetjen v.
Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918). -
140 See Hilton v. S.C. Pub. Rys. Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202 (1991) (holding that the
Court "will not depart from the doctrine of stare decisis without some compelling justifica-
tion"). For a discussion of the role of stare decisis in the federal courts' interpretation of
the Constitution and statutes, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTEEUTIONAL LAW
235-54 (3d ed. 2000). It is important to note that the issue of jurisdiction would not be an
easy hurdle for a party bringing the challenge at issue in this Note. See generally Bourriedi-
ene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to
hear habeas petitions filed by those detained as enemy combatants at Guantanamo Bay,
Cuba).
"' See infra notes 156-259 and accompanying text.
' 42 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a) (3) (A), 120 Stat.





 War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (d) (1) (A) (West 2000, Supp. 2006 &
Supp. IV 2007) ("The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to commit, an
act specifically intended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering (other than
pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions) upon another person within his custody or
physical control for the purpose of obtaining information or a confession, punishment,
intimidation, coercion, or any reason based on discrimination of any kind.") amended by
Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6.
145 Id. § 2441(d) (1) (B) ("The act of a person who commits, or conspires or attempts to
commit, an act intended to inflict severe or serious physical or mental pain or suffering
(other than pain or suffering incidental to lawful sanctions), including serious physical
abuse, upon another within his custody or control.").
'45 1d. § 2441(d) (1) (C) ("The act of a person who subjects, or conspires or attempts to
subject, one or more persons within his custody or physical control to biological experi-
ments without a legitimate medical or dental purpose and in so doing endangers the body
or health of such person or persons.").
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mutilation or maiming, 148
 intentionally causing serious bodily in-
jury,149 rape, 15° sexual assault or abuse,'" and taking hostages. 152 Thus,
as one commentator notes, treatment that seeks to humiliate or oth-
erwise shame the detainee does not fall within the elastic parameters
of "grave offenses" and would not violate the Geneva Conventions
unless a President were to cast such activity as a nongrave offense. 153
There are also questions as to whether "waterboarding" or sleep dep-
147 Id.
 § 2441(d) (1) (D) ("The act of a person who intentionally kills, or conspires or
attempts to kill, or kills whether intentionally or unintentionally in the course of commit-
ting any other offense under this subsection, one or more persons taking no active part in
the hostilities, including those placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, detention, or any
other cause.").
148 Id. § 2441(d) (1) (E) ("The act of a person who intentionally injures, or conspires or
attempts to injure, or injures whether intentionally or unintentionally in the course of
committing any other offense under this subsection, one or more persons taking no active
part in the hostilities, including those placed out of combat by sickness, wounds, deten-
tion, or any other cause, by disfiguring the person or persons by any mutilation thereof or
by permanently disabling any member, limb, or organ of his body, without any legitimate
medical or dental purpose.").
148
 War Crimes Act of 1996 § 2441(d) (I) (F) ("The act of a person who intentionally
causes, or conspires or attempts to cause, serious bodily injury to one or snore persons,
including lawful combatants, in violation of the law of war.").
158 Id. § 2441(d) (1)(G) ("The act of a person who forcibly or with coercion or threat
of force wrongfully invades, or conspires or attempts to invade, the body of a person by
penetrating, however slightly, the anal or genital opening of the victim with any part of the
body of the accused, or with any foreign object.").
151 Id. § 2441(d) (1) (H) (*The act of a person who forcibly or with coercion or threat
of force engages, or conspires or attempts to engage, in sexual contact with one or more
persons, or causes, or conspires or attempts to cause, one or more persons to engage in
sexual contact.").
152 Id. § 2441(d) (1) (1) ("The act of a person who, having knowingly seized or detained
one or more persons, threatens to kill, injure, or continue to detain such person or per-
sons with the intent of compelling any nation, person other than the hostage, or group of
persons to act or refrain from acting as an explicit or implicit condition for the safety or
release of such person or persons.").
133 Joanne Mariner, The Military Commissions Act of 2006• A Short Primer, FtunLAw, Oct.
25, 2006, http://writ.news.findlaw.corn/mariner/20061025.html
 (arguing that the MCA
"narrows the scope of the War Crimes Act, decriminalizing certain past acts"). President
Bush recently articulated interrogation standards by prohibiting "outrageous" acts in-
tended to humiliate an individual as well as actions "intended to denigrate the religion,
religious practices, or religious objects of an individual." Bush Alicia Rules for Interrogations,
MSNBC.com , July 20, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19873918 . President Bush's
commitment to religious tolerance here is commendable, but his Executive Order is so
vague that it might not have much of an impact. Bush Signs Executive Order Barring Cruel,
Inhumane Treatment of Terror Suspects, FOXNEws.com, July 20, 2007, http://www.foxnews
.corn/story/0,2933,290180,00.html
 [hereinafter Bush Signs Executive Order] ("Not wanting
to give up its terrorism playbook, the White House did not detail what types of interroga-
tion procedures, such as waterboarding, would be allowed. But it did offer parameters
• • • •"/ •
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rivation would be permissible. 154 Actions such as these are the issues at
stake when considering a President's possible interpretations of the
nongrave offenses of the Conventions. 155
A. The Military Commissions Ad as a Foreign Affairs Statute and the Impact
of Such a Classification opt Judicial Review
The MCA states that its purpose is to "provide procedures gov-
erning the use of military commissions to try alien unlawful enemy
combatants engaged in hostilities against the United States for viola-
tions of the law of war and other offenses triable by military commis-
sion."156 This statute is concerned both with the administration of cer-
tain wartime procedures and the United States' commitments to
international 'conventions; therefore, it undeniably constitutes a law
steeped in foreign policy. 157
The President, with all the privileges and tools of that office, has
access to information about the War on Terrorism and its progress,
and information about those individuals going before the military
commissions. 155 In making determinations about the Geneva Conven-
tions' demands, the President must be careful to preserve the ability
to manage an effective war, protect human rights, and ensure domes-
tic security because failure ill any of these areas is ultimately attrib-
uted to the Chief Executive. 155 Considered in this context, the Presi-
dent's power to interpret the Geneva Conventions pursuant to the
MCA is one that must be considered in light of the President's other
competing responsibilities, including both foreign and domestic pres-
sures. 160 The President's unique capacity to obtain a plethora infor-
154 Bush Signs Executive Order, supra note 153 (explaining that President Bush's Execu-
tive Order detailing interrogation rules is ambiguous with regard to the propriety of wa-
terboarding and sleep deprivation techniques).
155 See id. (insisting that the MCA demonstrates Congress's approval for "many of the
Administration's most short-sighted and dangerous counterterrorism policies").
156 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, section 3, § 948b(a), 120
Stat. 2600, 2602 (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C.A § 948(e) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007)).
157 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 312, 315.
156 See id. at 320.
156 See id.; see, e.g., Christiane Arnanpour, Anranpour: Looking Back at Rwanda Genocide,
CNN.com , Apr. 6, 2004, http://www.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/africa/04/06/rwanda.aman-
pour (noting President William Clinton's apology to the victims' families of the Rwandan
genocide for his failure to do more to help those "engulfed in this unimaginable terror").
16° See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320; see also Press Release, Ari Fleischer, White House
Press Secretary, Statement by the Press Secretary on the Geneva Convention (May 7, 2006),
hup://wwi.v.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/05/20030507-18.html (stating that al-
though "[t]he war on terrorism is a war riot envisaged when the Geneva. Convention was
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nation about the ever-changing conditions in the international arena
is especially important in times of war when American troops are fac-
ing new threats and tactics from enemies in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
around the world.' 61
In sum, an executive branch interpretation of the ambiguous Ge-
neva Conventions is impacted by the pressures of war and national se-
curity; therefore, the MCA sets forth clear parameters for what consti-
tutes "grave breaches" and provides the President with more flexibility
in making determinations about the remainder of the Conventions'
uncertain demands. 162
 The MCA also recognizes the importance of a
clear and consistent interpretation of what the Geneva Conventions
require. 163
 This is important both to ensure that the laws of the United
States are clear to those living under them and to protect America's
reputation abroad. 164
This foreign affairS statute resembles, to some degree, the law at
issue in the 1936 Supreme Court case United Slates v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., and comparing the two offers insight into the extent to which
the Court might be willing to let its decision in Curtiss-Wright dictate
its response to a challenge to the MCA or the President's actions un-
der its authority. 166 At issue in Curtiss-Wright was a joint resolution giv-
ing the President broad discretion to ban the sale of weapons to cer-
tain countries. 166
 In other words, it gave the President .authority to
make a decision about a foreign policy matter. 167
 The same is true of
signed in 1949 ... [t]he President has maintained the United States' commitment to the
principles of the Geneva Convention, while recognizing that the Convention simply does not
cover every situation").
161
 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320 (holding that the President, not Congress, has
the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and
especially is this true in time of war").
162
 See Mariner, supra note 153 (stating that "the War Crimes Act, as amended, satisfies
the U.S. obligation to criminalize grave breaches of Common Article 3, and the president
may issue authoritative interpretations of the remainder of the provision").
163 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6 (a) (3) (A), 120 Stat,
2600, 2632 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.CA. § 2441 (West 2000, Su pp. 2006 Sc Supp. IV
2007)); Remarks on Signing the Military Commissions Act of 2006, 42 WEEKLY COMP.
Pats. Doc. 1831, 1832 (Oct. 17 2006) ("[The MCA] spells out specific, recognizable of-
fenses that would be considered crimes in the handling of detainees so that our men and
women who question captured terrorists can perform their duties to the fullest extent of
the law. And this bill complies with both the spirit and the letter of our international obli-
gations.").
161
 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
Sce id. at 329.	 •
166 See id. at 312.
567 See	 Blumoff, supra note 48, at 275 (explaining the foreign affairs focus of the
statute).
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the MCA, which authorizes the President to interpret the Geneva
Conventions and the standards they set forth with regard to the
treatment of enemy combatants. 168 Curtiss-Wright recognized that the
President is the sole organ in international relations and that the
President's power in that area does not come from Congress."9 The
MCA adds further support for a President's interpretation of the Ge-
neva Conventions because it adds the approval of Congress on top of
the already inherent power vested in the Executive.'"
The Curtiss-Wright Court cited numerous examples of legislation,
some from the period of America's infancy, giving the President, in
areas of foreign policy, either unrestricted judgment or more latitude
than would otherwise be given in the domestic sphere."' Although
the Court noted in Curtiss-Wright that it was authorized to overrule an
unconstitutional act of Congress regardless of how much precedent
there was to support Congress's decision, it recognized the unusual
weight of the long history of legislation granting the President signifi-
cant authority in foreign policy matters. 172 The MCA seems to fit com-
fortably within this tradition.'" Additionally, the Court recently in
2006 in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld invited the President to seek authoriza-
tion from Congress to establish military commissions with new gov-
erning procedures, and the political branches dutifully responded
with the MCA. 174
As the above analysis demonstrates, although Curtiss-Wright is im-
portant. here because of Justice Sutherland's instructive dicta about
the President's authority to determine and carry out foreign policy, it
is also useful for its insight into how the Court, acting to pursuant to
Curtiss-Wright, should view a challenge to the MCA."5 Because both
cases involve laws empowering the President to direct foreign policy, it
is fitting that the MCA and the President's actions pursuant to it be
lea See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (A).
169 Sec 299 U.S. at 320.
171 See id.
171 See id. at 322-24.
172 See id. at 327 (noting that the Impressive array of legislation . . . enacted by nearly
every Congress from the beginning of our national existence to the present day, must be
given unusual weight in the process of reaching a correct determination of the problem").
I " See Shane & Liptak, supra note 15 (observing of the MCA that "[i]n adding a Con-
gressional imprimatur to a comprehensive set of procedures and tactics, lawmakers explic-
itly endorsed measures that in other eras were achieved by executive fiat").
174 See 126 S. Ct. 2749,2799 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring).
175 See 299 U.S. at 320.
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treated much like the joint resolution at issue in Curtiss-Wright, and be
upheld. 176
B. The Uncertain Application of the Political Question Doctrine to the
President's Interpretations of the Geneva Conventions
As noted in Part I, the Supreme Court might also determine that
a challenge to the President's interpretations of the Geneva Conven-
tions presents a nonjusticiable political question)" Although it makes
no difference to one seeking to invalidate the President's interpreta-
dons whether the Court upholds the interpretation or refuses to
reach a decision on justiciability grounds, the outcomes represent two
distinct results. 178
 The MCA represents an agreement between the po-
litical branches of government about the best ways to deal with Amer-
ica's detained terrorist enemies, but the extent to which challenges to
the MCA—and the President's interpretations of the Geneva Conven-
tions—present a nonjusticiable political question is unclear.' 79
On the one hand, the Court in 1918 in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.
held that the conduct of foreign relations is constitutionally commit-
ted to the executive and legislative branches of government, and the
decisions made by those branches are not subject to the review of an
unelected judiciary. 18° Applied to the MCA, this would mean that the
Court could not review a President's interpretations of the Geneva
Conventions with regard to nongrave offenses, because Congress and
the President have together reached a decision on how such questions
are to be resolved." 1
 It is difficult to accept this outcome, especially in
light of the Court's recent Hamdan decision wherein it rejected the
President's assertion that Common Article 3 does not apply to the in-
ternational struggle with al Qaeda. 182
 In the case of the MCA, how-
176
 See irl. at 329.
177 See Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302.
' 78
 Compare Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320, 329 (holding that the President, by the na-
ture of the office, is entitled to deference when conducting international relations), with
Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) (holding that whether Congress is
able to negate the actions of the President in the conduct of foreign affairs presents a po-
litical, and therefore, nonjusticiable political question).
176
 See Blumoff, supra note 48, at 230-31 (observing that there is no shortage of opin-
ions on the subject, but also no clear, consistently applied rule from the Court as to when
and if ever federal courts should review political decisions involving foreign policy).
183 246 U.S. at 302.
101
 Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a) (3) (A), 120 Stat.
2600, 2632 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp, IV
2007)); Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302.
182 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795.
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ever, the President is no longer acting unilaterally when interpreting
international obligations, but rather doing so with express authoriza-
tion from Congress. 183
On the other hand, the Court in 1961 in Baker v. Cart; despite
accepting the premise that many issues related to foreign affairs con-
stitute political questions, held that not all cases touching on foreign
affairs lie beyond judicial cognizance. 184 Baker offers examples of sce-
narios involving foreign policy matters when the Court has ruled on
the presented issue, such as those instances when the Court, in the
face of inconclusive action from the political branches, has construed
the meaning of the treaty) But those challenging the President's
authority to interpret the Geneva Conventions will find little support
in Bake); as that opinion goes on to hold that even if such a challenge
is justiciable, a court will not construe a treaty's demands in a manner
inconsistent with a federal law passed after the treaty's ratification.'
Looking closer at how the Court would treat a presidential inter-
pretation of the Geneva Conventions requires a careful analysis of the
Court's 1979 decision in Goldwater v. Carter, involving the President's
unilateral rescission of a treaty in the face of Congressional silence) 87
In his concurring opinion, Justice Rehnquist, joined by justice Stevens
and others, maintained that the President's rescission of a treaty and
Congress's authority to negate that action are nonjusticiable matters
of foreign affairs.' Applying this principle to a challenge to the Presi-
dent's interpretation—a less extreme action than rescission—of the Ge-
neva Conventions, it seems almost certain that the Court, applying
Justice Rehnquist's logic, should determine that the issue is nonjusti-
ciable. 189 This conclusion becomes even more certain when consid-
ered in light of the MCA's express grant of power to the President to
interpret the Geneva Conventions, a feature absent from Goldwater) °°
Justice Rehnquist's proposition that foreign affairs disputes
among the political branches pose nonjusticiable questions is not the
183 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (A). The Court in Hamdan invited
Congress to pass legislation of this kind, and the Congress was happy to oblige. See 126 S.
Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring).
184 See 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1961).
185 See id. at 212.
188 See id.
187 See 444 U.S. at 997-98 (Powell, J., concurring).
188 See id. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
189 Sec id.
190 See id. at 997-98 (Powell, J„ concurring).
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only scheme offered in Goldwater. 191
 Justice Powell articulates the posi-
tion that a matter of this type is reviewable by the courts only when
the political branches reach a "constitutional impasse." 192
 In the case
of the MCA, there is no such impasse between the political branches
because both appear to be in agreement about the 'allocation of
power between the President and Congress. 193
 Justice Powell is careful
to limit the COurt's review out of concern for the embarrassing, as
well as confusing, result of different branches offering different ac-
counts of the law. 194
 This is especially important in the case of the
MCA, since one of its aims is to clarify the laws of the United States for
those interrogating terrorist enemies.'"
Justice Brennan offers a third approach, expounding that the
political question doctrine restricts the courts from reviewing a for-
eign policy decision made by a branch constitutionally empowered to
make such a decision.' Under this approach, the courts are free to
discern whether a branch is constitutionally delegated as the appro-
priate authority. 197
 This view raises questions about the President's
constitutional authority to interpret treaties, as well the authority of
Congress to empower the President to issue such interpretations; but
those seeking to challenge the President's interpretations of the Ge-
neva Conventions face the formidable barrier that is raised by Con-
gress and the President's agreement on the matter. 198
 The degree of
191 See id. at 998 ("Mr. Justice Rehnquist suggests, however, that the issue presented by
this case is a nonjusticiable political question which can never be considered by this Court.
cannot agree.").
192 See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J., concurring).
195 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a) (3)(A), 120 Stat.
2600, 2632 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Stipp. IV
2007)).
194 See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1000 (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting Baker, 369 U.S. at
217).
195
 Remarks on Signing the Military Commissions Act of 2006, supra note 163, at 1832
(applauding the legislation because it 'spells out specific, recognizable offenses that would
be considered crimes in the handling of detainees so that our men and women who ques-
tion captured terrorists can perform their duties to the fullest extent of the taw"). For a
thoughtful discussion of the federal laws governing the prosecution of American citizens
who violate the law of war while outside the territorial limits of the United States, see gen-
erally Anthony E. Giardini), Note, Using Extraterritorial Jurisdiction to Prosecute Violations of the
Law of War: Looking Beyond the War Crimes Act, 48 B.C. L. Rs:v. 699 (2007). .
196
 See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1006-07 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
197 See id. at 1007.
198
 Harold Hongju" Koh et al., The Treaty Power, 43 U. 1n11Amt L. REV. 101, 124 (1988)
("Even without the political question doctrine, however, disputes over the distribution of
the treaty power will generally be nonjusticiable precisely because they are not about pri-
1 036
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caution with which the Court approaches issues of treaty interpreta-
tion is unmistakable and exemplified in Hamdan, which offers new
insights, and hence more confusion, into this problem. 199
C. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld as a Source of Guidance for the Supreme Court in
Its Review of the President's Interpretation of the Geneva Conventions
In 2006 in Hamdan the Court rejected the Bush administration's
first effort to establish military commissions to prosecute terrorist de-
tainees like Osama bin Laden's bodyguard and personal driver, Salim
Ahmed Hamdan. 200
The Court's ruling is important in proposing a course of action
for the Court when faced with a future challenge to the President's
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions for two reasons. 2° 1 First, it
represents an occasion in which the Court has intervened and invali-
dated the President's interpretation of a treaty. 202 Hamdan rejected
the Bush administration's argument that Common Article 3 of the
Conventions did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda. 203 Whether
the Court would take similar action if again presented with a chal-
lenge to the President's interpretations of the Geneva Conventions
depends on the impact of the MCA, which was passed after Ham-
dan.204 Unlike at the time of Hamdan, Congress has now explicitly au-
thorized the President to make official interpretations of the Geneva
Conventions with respect to nongrave offenses. 205
Second, while the Hamdan Court did much to clarify what com-
prises a "regularly constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees
which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples,"206 it left
open to Congress the option to alter the procedures governing those
vate rights. Rather, they concern institutional prerogatives for which the Constitution pro-
vides safeguards other than the judicial review.").
199 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796, 2798 (holding that Common Article 3's require-
ment that Hamdan be tried by a "regularly constituted court" must be satisfied, but that
secret evidence can be withheld from the detainee, despite custom and Common Article
3's demands, if there is statutory authorization for doing so).
2" See id. at 2761, 2786.
201 See id. at 2795, 2798.
202 See id. at 2795.
2" See id.
2°4 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6, 120 Stat. 2600, 2632
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 Sc Supp. IV 2007))
The MCA, which gives the President the authority to interpret certain provisions of the
Geneva Conventions, was agreed to by both the executive and legislative branches. See id.
2°5 See id. § 6(a) (3)(A).
206 See Harridan, 126 S. Ct. at 2796.
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courts."7
 Hamdan, therefore, enforced the demands of Common Arti-
cle 3 of the Geneva Conventions in one instance—namely, that it ap-
plies to the conflict with al Qaeda—but allowed for Congress to deter-
mine exactly what those demands arC. 208
 The MCA answered this
invitation and put the Bush Administration and Congress in agreement
as to what is appropriate conduct of the War on Terrorism. 206
D. The Executive and Legislative Branches Acting in Concert
In considering a challenge to the President's interpretation of the
Geneva Conventions, the Court will be guided by Justice Jackson's
framework first presented in 1952 in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Saw-
',cow Any interpretation by the President would be pursuant to the au-
thority expressly granted by Congress via the MCA; therefore, the
President's authority would be at its very peak and the office may be
said to "personify the federal sovereignty." 211
 So long as the MCA is not
unconstitutional, the Court should not disturb the President's interpre-
tations.212 Justice Breyer and Justice Kennedy's separate concurrences
in Hamdan also support this proposition because both invited Congress
and the President to enact a law on which they could both agree. 213
The hypothetical scenario that is the subject of this Note fits eas-
ily into Justice JacksOn's first category.214
 Even though the MCA gives
little, if any, statutory language to guide the President in interpreting
the Geneva Conventions' nongrave offenses, those interpretations do
not fall in Justice Jackson's "zone of twilight." 215
 The MCA is explicit
in authorizing the President to make interpretations, and it is this
207 See id. at 2798.
258
 See id. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating that "Liflothing prevents the Presi-
dent from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary" to create
military commissions and the procedures governing them).
" See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6.
210 See 343 U.S. at 635 ( Jackson, J., concurring); see also Hanuian, 126 S. Ct. at 2800
(Kennedy, J„ concurring) (stating that the "proper framework for assessing whether Ex-
ecutive actions are authorized is the three-part scheme used by justice Jackson" in Youngs-
town).
211
 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635.
212 See id.
7 ' 3
 See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2799 (Breyer, J., concurring); id. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., con-
curring).
214 See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635-37 (Jackson, J., concurring).
215 See id. at 637.
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grant of authority itself that is the focus of the inquiry. 216 Even if the
President were considered to be acting in the "zone of twilight," the
circumstances involved and the imperatives of the situation would
guide the Court's review. 217 There is arguably no greater imperative
than the crisis of war and international terrorism, so the Court might
well find that under these circumstances the President's interpreta-
tions are constitutional. 218 Thus, applying Justice Jackson's Youngstown
framework to the issue at hand demonstrates just how difficult it
would be for the Court to invalidate a presidential interpretation of
the Geneva Conventions' nongrave offenses. 219
E. Analogizing the President's Authorization to Interpret the Geneva
Conventions to Chevron
Setting aside the issue of where the power to interpret interna-
tional treaties lies, the MCA authorizes the President to interpret the
requirements of the Geneva Conventions with respect to its nongrave
offenses and to publish those interpretations so as to make their bind-
ing effect known. 22° In this way, the MCA is like any other piece of leg-
islation delegating to agencies within the executive branch the au-
thority to promulgate standards and issue regulations. 221 The analogy
is strained, however, by the fact that the MCA delegates authority not
to an agency within the executive department, but rather, directly to
the Chief Executive. 222 Despite this, the Court should address a chal-
lenge to the President's interpretations of what constitutes a nongrave
offense of the Geneva Conventions with an eye toward its 1984 deci-
sion in Chevron. U.S.A. Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council, i n a 223
216 Sec Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a) (3) (A), 120 Stat.




Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637.
215 See id. at 637 n.3 (noting the ambiguity surrounding who has the authority to au-
thorize the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and President Lincoln's assertion that
it [is] an executive function" even in the face of judicial challenge).
219 See id. at 635-38.
220 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (A)—(C).
221 See, e.g., Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (1) (2000) (authorizing the Administra-
tor of the Environmental Protection Agency to prescribe national primary ambient air
quality standards 'based on such criteria and allowing an adequate margin of safety. [as]
are requisite to protect the public health").
222 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (A).
225 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 892-43. United States v. Mead Corp. appears irrelevant in this
analysis. See 533 U.S. 218, 231-32 (2001). The Mead Court determined that the Customs
ruling letter at issue did not qualify for Chevron deference because the terms of the con-
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Pursuant to the framework articulated in Chevron, the court should
first determine whether Congress's intent is clear as to the President's
interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, and if so, that intent must
be given effect. 224 Because congressional intent in the MCA appears
clear, the Court's inquiry would likely end here. 225
 If, however, the
Court determines that Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, then it must examine whether the President has
construed the statute in a permissible manner. 226
The Court's treatment of the hypothetical problem presented in
this Note should both commence and conclude with the first Chevron
inquiry. 227 As stated above, the MCA's grant of authority to the Presi-
dent to "interpret the meaning and application of the Geneva Con-
ventions and to promulgate higher standards and administrative regu-
lations for violations of treaty obligations which are not grave
breaches" is direct and devoid of ambiguity. 228 Congress's intent in the
MCA is easily discernable: Congress wants the President to interpret
what nongrave offenses are, and wants those interpretations to be au-
thoritative in the same way that those of any other agency are. 229 Thus,
a challenge to a President's interpretations would likely be rebuffed
because effect must be given to Congress's will. 230 Therefore, the
Court should follow the approach of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit in 1996 in Marincas v. Lewis and end its inquiry at Chev-
ron's first step. 231
Alternatively, and perhaps less convincingly, one could focus on
the clumsy and bewildering portion of the MCA that regards what, if
gressional delegation [gave] no indication that Congress meant to delegate authority to
Customs to issue classification rulings with the force of law." Id. With regard to the MCA,
however, the language of the statute makes clear that "1a)ny Executive Order published
under this paragraph shall be authoritative (except as to grave breaches of common Arti-
cle 3) as a matter of United States law, in the same manner as other administrative regula-
tions." See Military Commissions Act . of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (C).
224 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
225 See id.; Marincas v. Lewis, 92 F.3d 195,200-01 (3d Cir. 1996).
225 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842.
227 See id.
225 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (A). Although the MCA unambigu-
ously gives the President interpretative authority, the boundaries of that interpretative
discretion are wholly unclear; for this problem, however, Chevron is not relevant. Sec id.;
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-44.
229 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (A)—(C).
25° See id.
251 See 92 F.3d at 201 (explaining that there was no need to proceed to Chevron's sec-
ond inquiry because the Refugee Act of 1980 was clear in what it demanded of the Attor-
ney General).
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an statutory limits exist to cage the President's interpretative discre-
tion. 232 Even under this approach, however, it appears unlikely that the
President's interpretation would be invalidated under Chevron's second
prong. 233 The Chevron Court expressed that it would give considerable
weight to the executive department's statutory constructions so long as
they were not arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the stat-
ute. 234 The fact that the MCA is a foreign affairs statute adds to the
weight of the executive branch's construction because such interpreta-
tions typically receive substantial deference. 235 Interpreting the Geneva
Conventions requires acute awareness of the demands of geopolitical
crises and the expectations of other signatories party to the Conven-
tions, both of which occupy a realm wherein the President has consid-
erable capabilities, constitutional authority, and expertise. 236 Addition-
ally, given that a treaty is at issue, the President's interpretation of that
document, if consistently followed, should be given additional
weight. 237
In this context, the Court would likely follow its 1986 decision in
Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Society, involving a federal law
that gave the Commerce Secretary the authority to make decisions
about the whaling practices of other countries, relative to the stan-
dards set by an international corn mission. 233 The Court deferred to
the Secretary's construction because it neither contradicted the lan-
guage of the law nor frustrated congressional intent. 239 Similarly, the
President's interpretations of the Geneva Conventions, to the extent
they are reasonable, would be seen as in conformity with a Congress
that recognized the exigencies of the post-September 11, 2001 world
and wished to give the President broad discretion, on this matter. 24°
It could also be argued that when evaluating the President's in-
terpretations, the Court should not be concerned with whether the
interpretation itself was arbitrary and capricious, but rather whether
the President's reading of the MCA was arbitrary and capricious. 241
232 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (A).
233 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
234 See id.
235 See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 242 (1984); Springfield Indus. Corp. v. United
States, 842 F.2d 1284, 1286 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
236 Sec Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
237 See Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S. 433, 442 (1921).






211 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
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The terms of the statute are clear, and the MCA, without question,
delegates the authority to interpret to the President. 242 It appears,
therefore, that those who challenge the President's interpretations
would be doing so not on the grounds authority is lacking under the
MCA, but because those critics fundamentally disagree with those in-
terpretations. 243 For this, Chevron provides no remedy. 244
Ultimately, the administrative law concepts at work in Chevron
representing a concern for expertise and accountability would un-
doubtedly overwhelm any challenge to the President's interpretations
of the Geneva Conventions. 245 The President has particular expertise
in dealing with matters of foreign policy, 246 thus satisfying administra-
tive law's desire to vest authority in that office. 247 Particularly satisfying
in the case of the MCA, however, is the fact that the "agency" is the
elected office of the presidency, which is far more accountable than
any department secretary or administrator. 248
F. The President's Interpretations of the Geneva Conventions and the
Constraints Imposed by International Law
The basic principles relevant to a President's authority to inter-
pret a treaty have reduced import when considering the problem pre-
sented in this Note because the MCA articulates a position of agree-
ment on treaty interpretation between the legislative and executive
branches. 249 That said, the law governing treaty interpretation is a
complex area worthy of careful study in its own right, and although
this discussion does not purport to present even a cursory survey of
that pasture, certain principles are worth mentioning because of their
relevance to the question posed. 250
242 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a) (3) (A) , 120 Stat.
2600, 2632 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp. IV
2007)),
243 See Huq, supra note 15 ("[W]hat happens when the executive reads Geneva in a
clearly unreasonable way?").
2" See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
242 See id. at 865-66.
246 See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320.
247 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
246 See Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, § 6(a) (3) (A), 120 Stat.
2600, 2632 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.A. § 2441 (West 2000, Supp. 2006 & Supp. IV
2007)),
2" See id.
250 See generally Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190 (1888).
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The MCA authorizes the President to make determinations about
what constitutes a nongrave breach of the Geneva Conventions, and
those interpretations are entitled to great weight. 251 Pursuant to the
MCA, the President's interpretations are authoritative "as a matter of
United States law "252 As a result, to the extent that the President's in-
terpretation conflicts with what may well be a more accurate reading
of the Conventions' demands, the President's interpretation—having
legal effect later in time—will control and take primacy over the
original meaning of the Conventions' terms. 253 Whatever the Geneva
Conventions initially held, Congress is free to abrogate those re-
quirements as it did when it authorized the President to interpret the
Conventions. 254 So long as Congress isclear in its action and purpose,
the courts, from that point onward, are under no obligation to inter-
pret the statute harmoniously with the treaty. 255
In the hypothetical problem at issue, the Court would not be
bound by an earlier understanding of the Geneva Conventions in
evaluating the President's interpretations of lesser offenses. 256 Addi-
tionally, as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit made
clear in 1986 in Garcia-Mir v. Meese, the ultimate determinate of the
obligations of the United States is domestic welfare, as the President
understands 4. 257 In other words, when acting in accordance with a
constitutional grant of authority, the President may disregard interna-
tional law in service of domestic needs. 258 Notwithstanding what some
may think the Geneva Conventions require, the President, with au-
thorization from Congress and in furtherance of the national welfare,
is free to interpret authoritatively what constitutes a nongrave breach
of those Conventions as he or she determines appropriate. 259
251 See Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184-85 (1982); Kolovrat v.
Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).
252 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (C).
255 See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (stating that the laws of the United States and its treaty
obligations are of the same force, and that "[w]hen the two relate to the same subject, the
courts will always endeavor to construe them so as to give effect to both, if that can be
done without violating the language of either; but if the two are inconsistent, the one last
in date will control the other").
254 See Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 6(a) (3) (C).
255 See United States v. Palestine Liberation Org., 695 F. Supp. 1456, 1465 (S.D.N.Y
1988).
259 See id.
257 See Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446, 1454-55 (11th Cir. 1986).
259 See id. at 1455.
259 See Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; Garcia-Mir, 788 F.2d at 1454-55; Palestine Liberation, 695
F. Supp. at 1465. By no means complete or representative of all the scholarship or juris-
prudence in this area of the law, this discussion of the President's authority to interpret
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III. EXTRAJUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES AVAILABLE TO THOSE
CHALLENGING THE PRESIDENT'S INTERPRETATIONS
OF THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS
1A7lien faced with a challenge to one of the President's interpreta-
tions of what constitutes, a nongrave breach of the Geneva Conven-
tions, the Court, if it is to act according to its own prior jurisprudence,
should either affirm the President's interpretation or refuse to hear
the case on justiciability grounds. 26° This Note does not dispute that
anyone bringing such a challenge may have the moral high ground,
but it does recognize the Supreme Court's prior rulings leading to the
inevitable conclusion that an Article Ill court is not the appropriate
forum to strike the President's interpretation. 261
 Put simply, constru-
ing the Geneva Conventions in such a way that permits torture is
wrong, but this admonition should come not from the bench of the
Supreme Court, but rather from the halls of Congress. 262
This Part explores three extrajudicial approaches that one seek-
ing to change the President's interpretations might pursue. 263 First,
political activism that seeks to bring change to the leadership in Wash-
ington, cannot be underestimated.264
 As the 2006 midterm elections
demonstrated, sometimes the best way to alter the course of America's
dealings with the world is through elections at home. 265 Those elec-
tions brought not just new legislative majorities, but also demon-
strated the popular discontent with Republican leadership and the
Iraq War.266
 In response to this discontent, President Bush altered his
previous course of action by accepting the resignation of Defense Sec-
treaties is offered merely to demonstrate a potential factor in the Court's decision that,
when considered with the others presented earlier in this Note, would close yet another
door to one's challenge of the President's interpretations of the Geneva Conventions. See
Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194; Palestine Liberation, 695 F. Stipp. at 1465.
266
 See, Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., concurring);
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concur-
ring); United Suites v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936); Oetjen v.
Cent. Leather Co., 296 U.S. 297, 302 (1918),
261
 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; Goldwater, 494 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concur-
ring); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320;
Oetjen, 296 U.S. at 302.
262
 Sec Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson.", concur-
ring); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S, at 320.
265 See infra notes 264-279.
264
 See Dan Balz, For Bush's New Direction, Cooperation Is the Challenge, WAS/I. Posy, Nov.
9, 2006, at Al.
265 See id.
266 See id.
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retary Donald Rumsfeld in hopes of Finding a "fresh perspective" on
that struggle. 267 Despite the example set by those who so often cir-
cumvent the political process and rush to the judicial branch to bring
about social change, these elections demonstrate the overwhelming
force of popular opinion and its ability to achieve the same result. 268
Second, the legislative process provides another outlet by which
the President's interpretations of the Geneva Conventions can be
changed.269 The President's interpretations are only effective to the
extent that Congress will tolerate them, and because the President's
interpretations carry the same force as other administrative agency
regulations, Congress always has the option of passing a law that over-
rides those interpretations. 270 In fact, the 110th Congress has already
seen the introduction of the "Restoring the Constitution Act of 2007,"
which is one example of such legislation."'
Filially, related to this idea of the legislative process is the fact that
Congress is equipped with tools of oversight. 272 A clear manifestation of
this is the MCA's requirement that u[n]ot later than December 31 each
year, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on
Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives a re-
port on any trials conducted by military commissions under this chap-
ter during such year."273 This is by no means an exhaustive account of
the options available to those unhappy with the President's policies,
and regardless of which option is pursued, the fact remains that an un-
savory interpretation of the Geneva Conventions should be invalidated
by Congress, using all the force of the people it represents. 274
267 See id. Mlle president took the most dramatic step yesterday in acknowledging how
much the landscape has changed. At a midday news conference he announced that he had
accepted the resignation of Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld ....").
26s See id.
269 See Press Release, Sen. John McCain, McCain Urges Final Passage of the Military
Commissions Act of 2006 (Sept. 28, 2006), http://mccain.senate.gov//press_office/view_
article.cfin?id = 760.
279 See id.; see also Bradley, supra note 88, at 673 ("Courts defer to agencies because
Congress has presumptively delegated lawmaking power to those agencies. Congress legis-
lates against the backdrop of this presumption and is always able to override it.").
271 See White, supra note 20.




274 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43; Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635 ( Jackson, J., concur-
ring); Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320. Allowing the Court to fill this ride and invalidate the
President's interpretations would set a dangerous precedent. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-
43; Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 1002 (Rehnquist, J., concurring); Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635
( Jackson, J., concurring) Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320; Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302. If the
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CONCLUSION
The MCA empowers the President to interpret the Geneva Con-
ventions and make determinations as to which actions constitute
nongrave breaches of those treaties. Assuming that the Supreme
Court has jurisdiction to hear a challenge to one of these interpreta-
tions, its own prior jurisprudence would require that it either uphold
the President's interpretation or dismiss the challenge on justiciability
grounds.
The MCA makes clear that the President's interpretations of what
constitutes a nongrave breach of the Geneva Conventions is authórita-
tive. Additionally, the President's interpretations of these treaties are
steeped in foreign policy, an area in which the President enjoys great
deference and inherent power. The fact that the MCA is a law of the
United States codifying Congress's explicit authorization of the Presi-
dent's power to interpret these Conventions further adds to the legal
weight of these interpretations. Because Congress's intent is clear in
giving the President this authority, a reviewing court should also rec-
ognize the deference traditionally given to those empowered by the
legislature to perform the tasks that the controlling statute enumer-
ates. Finally, the Court's prior decisions also expound on the defer-
ence traditionally given to a President when interpreting a treaty to
which the United States is a party. This precedent, judicial principles
spanning various areas of the law, and the text of the MCA, make
clear that federal courts do not present a path to change for those
challenging the wisdom of the President's decisions. The President,
with respect to the federal courts, lies beyond reproach. A remedy lies
elsewhere—namely, in the political branches and the political process
itself.
For some, the MCA adequately circumscribes the President's au-
thority by ensuring that no detainee is subject to the grave breaches of
Court were to review the President's interpretations and determine that they conflict with
the Geneva Conventions' demands, the Court would essentially be imposing the interna-
tional law's higher standards to a domestic law. See Military Commissions Act of 2006
§ 6(a)(2). With a precedent of this kind on the record, any international convention to
which the United States were a party could be used as lever by which the Court could then
ratchet up the companion domestic law's requirements. See United States v. Georgescu,
723 F. Supp. 912, 921 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Moreover, the wisdom of passing an act like the
MCA should not affect a court's decision of whether to review the President's interpreta-
tion, because in future cases, the'public policy considerations could be different. See Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2046 § 6(a). If a law were passed that some viewed as more posi-
tive than the MCA, might an activist court interfere with that law and overrule it, citing this
instance as its precedent for doing so? Id.
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the Geneva Conventions, and that the remaining interrogation pro-
cedures are thoSe required to fight an effective war against terrorism.
For others, it allows for behavior that is both an affront to human
dignity and inconsistent with American ideals. Both views present im-
portant realities, but there is only one certainty. Now, more than ever,
it is important for Americans to exercise the freedom that soldiers risk
their lives everyday to defend. Ultimately, real change comes from the
advocacy of the American people who, through their voices and ac-
tions, project an image of America across the globe.
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